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The Anarchist Official: 
A Problem for Legal Positivism 
KENNETH M EHRENBERG†  
Many legal theorists have expounded conceptions of law or legal systems 
that depend heavily upon a key role to be played by legal officials. In most 
cases, it is not just the actions, but the beliefs of those legal officials that 
make the difference between a legal system and simple control by coercion. 
In H.L.A. Hart’s positivist theory, legal officials create legal facts by 
accepting legal rules (especially a central validity rule) from an internal 
point of view. Since these legal facts are social facts, their dependence upon 
the acceptance of legal officials makes it possible for ordinary citizens to 
have legal obligations without those citizens ever accepting that they do.  
If this influential theory requires for its conception of law that legal 
officials accept, adopt, or uphold law as a valuable component of social 
organisation or as providing them with robust reasons for action, then the 
possibility that legal systems can continue to function when some or all key 
officials do not hold those beliefs is problematic. Given the pivotal role the 
theory gives to these officials, if the officials do not have the requisite 
beliefs, then the theory would be telling us that we are not looking at a legal 
system, that no laws of the system could be valid, or at least that no one 
could be obligated by the laws of the system. If, apart from what the theory 
is telling us, we have what appears to be a working legal system, then it is 
difficult to see why these beliefs should play such a pivotal role, throwing 
positivism’s reliance on officials’ beliefs into doubt. 
My primary contention in this paper is that if a legal system can 
continue to exist and function when its key officials do not accept the value 
or guidance of the law, then we have a reason to amend those legal 
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1  I admit that ‘key officials’ is a rather vague term, whose referents can 
change easily when considering legal systems in different times and 
circumstances. In some cases, they may simply be those who are tasked with 
creating and/or assigning legal obligations. In others, they will be those 
upon whom those obligations depend for recognition of their legal validity. 
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philosophies that cannot accommodate such a situation. I focus on legal 
positivism (of Hart and Joseph Raz) as the theory that has the most currency 
among analytic legal philosophers, and with which I find myself in closest 
agreement.2 For the purposes of this investigation, anarchists believe that 
the law cannot successfully obligate or create reasons for action beyond the 
prudential reason to avoid sanction (and possibly other situational 
prudential reasons, such as where law coordinates behaviour in an 
emergency or to avert a dangerous situation).3 I contend that the possibility 
of key officials holding these beliefs should be considered as a problem for 
legal philosophy (and not limited to pure political theory). I begin by 
examining the anarchist claim, and then show why officials accepting the 
claim are a problem for positivism, starting with a discussion of obligation 
in Hart’s positivism. Then I turn to an examination of the role of officials’ 
acceptance of the law in Hart and Raz. I do not discuss the merits of the 
anarchist claims at all, as that is irrelevant to the project.  
There are many kinds of anarchists. Some believe law is fine so long 
as it is not implemented by a government. I will not treat that belief here 
since the legal theory that is the target of this analysis takes governmental 
law to be its primary object of study. Additionally, the term ‘anarchist’ is 
not meant to carry any disparagement. It is used in its philosophical sense of 
someone who does not accept that the law carries any particular obligation 
or who believes the law to be socially disadvantageous, rather than its 
sometimes pejorative political sense of someone who seeks to undermine 
government, perhaps by violent means. 
The anarchist claim 
The anarchist claim is that the law cannot give us non-prudential reasons for 
action (what I sometimes call the ‘antinomian claim’). This should not be 
confused for another type of anarchist claim (what I call the ‘disvalue 
claim’) that the law has a negative value overall. It is possible for the law to 
be bad for us, but to give us non-prudential reasons for action;4 or for it not 
to provide such reasons, but not have negative value. For example, one 
could believe that all law fundamentally and necessarily entrenches male-
                                                           
2  I believe that a similar although perhaps even more serious problem arises 
for natural lawyers like John Finnis, but that will have to be dealt with 
elsewhere. 
3  In what follows I will generally understand non-prudential reasons to 
include obligations, except where it is important to discuss obligations 
separately.  
4  One example of this might be in situations where we have undertaken a 
promise to obey the law. For helpful analysis and illustrations of this 
example, see Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (1987) 62. 
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centred power structures, and hence to be of disvalue overall in the context 
of a wider belief in the equality of the sexes. This person could nonetheless 
believe that the law successfully provides non-prudential reasons, perhaps 
to stop at a red light even when we know no one is around. Conversely, one 
could believe that the law performs valuable behaviour guidance and 
coordination functions (the reasons for conformance with which are purely 
prudential), but not believe that it ever is successful in its claims to provide 
non-prudential reasons. This belief could be based upon the idea that all 
non-prudential reasons are pre-existing moral obligations, and any claims to 
create another class of specifically legal obligations are fictional. Or it could 
be based on the belief that legal obligations are at least non-binding and, 
therefore, do not generate reasons to comply. 
The antinomian claim is a bit narrower in focus than the disvalue 
claim. To this anarchist, the law can only command by force.5 Hence there 
can be nothing wrong with breaking the law in itself, so long as one gets 
away with it, and the only thing wrong with getting caught is getting 
punished. The law might claim to provide non-prudential reasons, creating 
duties and obligations, but such claims are always necessarily a ruse. Under 
this view, when someone answers the question ‘Why did you do that?’ with 
the statement ‘Because it is the law’, either she properly means by this only 
that she seeks to avoid punishment for failure to behave in that way, or she 
shows that she has been taken in by the law’s false claim to have 
successfully given her independent reasons. 
A person who accepts the antinomian claim may still believe in the 
validity of moral obligation and that the law’s commands can coincide with 
one’s moral obligations. We are obligated not to kill each other, and the law 
commands us to comply with that obligation.6 But under the antinomian 
claim, in doing so, law does not add any reason to the already existing 
moral one, except a self-regarding prudential one not to do something that 
would incur punishment. One way to cash out this view would be to say 
that no mere legal obligation (an obligation the law claims to have made) 
can be binding in itself, and that legal obligations are not a separate extant 
class of obligations; all obligations are pre-existent moral ones, or else they 
are prudential ones created either by the fear of whatever retaliation the law 
                                                           
5  This statement should not be misunderstood to mean that this kind of 
anarchist is a classical positivist, nor that the classical positivists were 
anarchists in any sense. For one, this anarchist would not see any obligation 
arising from the threat of force. 
6  The literature makes a helpful distinction between mere conformity to the 
law and being guided by the law, where conformity is based on having non-
legal moral or prudential reasons for behaving as the law happens to dictate. 
See e.g. Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (2d ed, 1990) 124. 
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uses to support its commands or as a result of the law’s offering a solution 
to an important coordination problem. (Later we will see the importance of 
the distinction between notions of mere legal obligations, which are valid 
within the legal system that generates them, and notions of morally binding 
legal obligations, understood as moral duties that only come into existence 
with law.) 
There are plenty of very good arguments against these views, and the 
reader probably already has quite a few in mind. Remember, however, that 
we are not concerned here with the validity of these positions, but rather 
with what happens when these views are held by key legal officials. If a 
legal system can continue to operate and function with such officials, but a 
theory of law cannot explain that, then that theory of law is deficient. 
Hart’s notion of obligation 
H.L.A. Hart’s theory is that the law consists in the union of primary rules 
and secondary rules in a system in which key officials accept those rules as 
valid under a rule of recognition.7 This rule of recognition consists in the 
criteria that the officials use to determine which rules are valid within their 
legal system. For Hart, these officials must accept the rules internally, as 
reasons or justifications for their behaviour in applying and enforcing the 
laws.8 The presence or absence of a legal system is a social fact that 
depends on these officials’ acceptance and behaviour.  
In developing this theory, Hart argued against the earlier positivist 
view that legal obligation resulted from the command of a sovereign backed 
by a threat of force. For Hart, such a ‘gunman situation’ could create a state 
of affairs in which we would be obliged to act according to the command, 
but not obligated to do so.9 In order to give rise to legal obligation, some 
people must accept the rule internally: both as a reason and justification for 
                                                           
7  H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed, 1994) 91ff. Primary rules govern 
conduct directly; secondary rules govern primary rules (providing for their 
creation, change, elimination, etc.) or other secondary rules. See K K Lee, 
'Hart's Primary and Secondary Rules' (1968) 77 Mind 561; Lawrence B 
Solum, Primary and Secondary Rules, Legal Theory Lexicon (2004) 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le_2.
html. 
8  See e.g. Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, 'Peter Winch and H L A Hart: Two 
Concepts of the Internal Point of View' (2007) 20 Canadian Journal of Law 
& Jurisprudence 453, 459; Scott J. Shapiro, 'What Is the Internal Point of 
View?' (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1157, 1165. 
9  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 82, arguing against John Austin, The 
Province of Jurisprudence Determined; and, the Uses of the Study of 
Jurisprudence (1998). 
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their actions in conformity with it, and as a ground for criticism of others 
who do not conform. If the right people (i.e., key officials) accept the rule 
internally, then those subject to the rule can be said to be under an 
obligation even if those subjects do not accept that obligation.10 
Hart was clear that the motivation for a person accepting the rule is 
not important for it to represent a reason or obligation,11 so long as the 
motivation is not one of fear of reprisal,12 and even then such fear is only 
problematic for those upon whom it is incumbent to accept the law 
internally.13 Hence, an official who accepts the rules in order to retain his 
job is just as good at creating legal reasons and obligations as one who 
believes the law is conducive to important social ends.14 The problem with 
fear of reprisal is that it does not give rise to the recognition of a legal 
obligation, only a psychological feeling of being compelled. Also, when 
one acts out of fear of reprisal, it is that fear which serves as the reason for 
one’s act in conformity with the rule, rather than the rule itself. Other 
motivations can lead the person to recognise the rule as an instrumental 
reason. According to Hart, the existence of a legal obligation is a social fact 
                                                           
10  Hart, following Bentham and Kelsen, held that legal obligations were sui 
generis to the law and not a species of moral obligation, a view disputed by 
Joseph Raz, who holds that legal obligations are claims to impose moral 
obligations. H L A Hart, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political 
Theory (1982) 128ff; Joseph Raz, 'Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties' 
(1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123, 129; Raz, Practical Reason 
and Norms op cit, p 127; id. ‘No system is a system of law unless it includes 
a claim of legitimacy, of moral authority. That means that it claims that legal 
requirements are morally binding, that is that legal obligations are real 
(moral) obligations arising out of the law.’ Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and 
Legal Duties op cit, p 131. Hence, in discussing Hart’s theory, legal 
obligations are to be understood as social creations and not to imply any 
moral obligation to comply. See also Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of 
View? op cit, p 1161. Nevertheless, in that they are still obligations they still 
represent non-prudential reasons in that, where legally valid, they apply 
regardless of the interests of the subject. 
11  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 203. 
12  id. Of course, one might have multiple motivations, and even where fear is 
the primary factor, secondary motivations may suffice to lead one to see the 
rule as a reason when there is no risk of reprisal. 
13  id. 
14  Seeing rule following as a means to retaining the official’s job should not be 
misunderstood to be a fear of losing the job as a form of reprisal. Hart 
provides a non-exhaustive list of motivations someone might have for 
accepting legal rules internally to show that the motivation need not be 
moral. The list includes ‘calculations of long term interest’ and ‘the mere 
wish to do as others do’. Id. 
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that is independent of the feeling of being bound, which one might or might 
not have accompanying it. 
Another important way to view the distinction between motivations 
from fear of reprisal and other motivations is through the lens of the internal 
and external points of view. One who complies with the law purely out of 
fear of retaliation is using the law simply as a prediction of what others will 
do and hence never will see the law itself as a reason for action.15 To see 
this, just consider that one who acts only out of fear of reprisal will never 
have a reason to comply with the law so long as he is sure of avoiding the 
reprisal. Most other motivations for compliance, however, will allow one to 
see obedience to the law as instrumentally valuable to achieving the goal 
embodied by that motivation. If one wishes to do as others do, then even 
though the law is initially still just a predictor of behaviour, one can come 
to view it as (instrumentally) reason-giving when one understands that 
others are trying to conform their behaviour to it. Since others are trying to 
comply with it, and this person is motivated to do as others do, he comes to 
see the law as giving him a reason to do as it requires. This is to see its 
requirement as a legal obligation, and according to Hart, it need not be to 
see it as a moral one.16 
There is some suggestion in the literature that Hart and other modern 
positivists such as Joseph Raz and Jules Coleman are mistaken to exclude 
fear of reprisal as a permissible primary motivation for officials. For 
example, Matthew Kramer has pointed out in passing that Gregory Kavka 
proved the possibility of a government in which each official is only 
motivated to comply by fear of all the others.17 While this was not intended 
                                                           
15  id. Seeing the law as primarily a predictor of others’ behaviour is, of course, 
the classic stance of the legal realist, exemplified by O.W. Holmes’ ‘bad 
man,’ who analyses the law in terms of what he can get away with. Oliver 
Wndell Holmes, 'The Path of the Law' (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 
459. This view was a target for Hart, who believed the law is just as much 
for the ‘puzzled man’ who is seeking guidance. Hart, The Concept of Law 
op cit, p 40. The issue this paper addresses could be interpreted as asking 
what happens to Hart’s (and Raz’s) theory when Holmes’ bad men are the 
key officials (except that the officials would not be depending on the 
internal acceptance of anyone else). 
16  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 203. See also supra note 10. 
17  Matthew H Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law without Trimmings 
(1999) 94; Matthew H Kramer, 'Review of the Practice of Principle by Jules 
Coleman' (2003) 62 The Cambridge Law Journal 495, 497  See also Sean 
Coyle, 'Practices and the Rule of Recognition' (2006) 25 Law and 
Philosophy 417, 433 The references are to Kavka’s ‘The Paradox of Perfect 
Tyranny,’ Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (1986) 
254. 
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by Kramer to be a complete argument, as it stands it is not enough to prove 
the point against Hart and the others. Kavka showed that it would be 
possible for a government to be based entirely on a ‘net of fear’, in which 
each citizen (and official) is only compliant out of fear of what the others 
will do to her, with no one of them (except the single sovereign issuing the 
directives) motivated directly by her acceptance of the sovereign as justified 
rule-giver.18 I emphasise the word ‘government’ in the previous sentence 
because that is the focus of Kavka’s argument; he does not apply this 
argument to the concept of law or the possibility of a legal system with such 
characteristics. Hence Hart and the others could easily reply that it might be 
possible for a government to be entirely founded upon fear. But unless and 
until some key officials adopt the internal aspect of rules and see the 
directives of the leader as reason-giving, we would be hard-pressed to say 
that we are looking at a legal system. We would not have the requisite 
network of recognition and ‘critical reflective attitudes’ that make a legal 
system possible.19 It would just be the gunman situation writ-large.20 
In a way, my arguments below can be seen as an attempt to bring a 
version of Kramer’s Kavka-esque point home against this element of 
modern positivism. Rather than focusing on what I take to be the politically 
and psychologically confusing case of officials being motivated by fear, 
                                                           
18  Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory op cit, p 257. 
19  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 57. See also id; Shapiro, What Is the 
Internal Point of View? op cit, p 1165 (explaining how the rule of 
recognition validates other primary rules even when those other rules are 
being ignored). 
20  In an enlightening email exchange, Michael Stokes (in his role as Editor of 
this journal) helped me to see even more clearly why the need for internal 
acceptance not motivated by fear is a requirement for key officials but not 
for ordinary citizens (or even petty officials). Stokes suggested that the 
hypothetical situation of a game of tennis played under threat shows the 
possibility of accepting rules from the internal point of view while doing so 
out of fear. In such a game, it would appear that the players can have a 
perfectly legitimate game while complying with the rules only because of 
fear. (Stokes suggests that the players adopt the internal point of view with 
respect to the rules in order to play the coerced game, but I am not sure this 
is clear – we may be engaged with the rules in order to comply, but we are 
not taking the rules themselves as our reason for action.) Even the umpire of 
the game can apply the rules out of fear, so long as there are not hard cases 
requiring an interpretation of the rules. However, if there were a hard case, 
or one that required an appeal to the governing body of the game, it does not 
make sense to say that fear can motivate a specific interpretation of the 
rules. If the official acts under the threat ‘decide as you are directed to or 
else…’, then the decision is not an application of the rules; if the official 
acts under the threat ‘decide correctly or else…’, then the threat is not 
providing any guidance and is immaterial to the application of the rule. 
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however, I ask simply what happens when officials do not accept the law 
itself as reason-giving. If the answer still allows for the presence of a legal 
system, then Hart’s imagined response to Kramer and Kavka is insufficient 
on its face. 
An antinomian anarchist does not recognise a non-prudential reason 
arising from the law, and hence will not see any legal obligation as binding. 
In this, she might be understood to say that legal obligations are fictional, or 
at least are not reason-generating.21 The more important issue is whether a 
group of officials who adopt this view could still create or maintain such an 
obligation on others. If the anarchists can do so, then Hartian-style 
positivism does not have a problem with the anarchist official. However, if 
anarchist officials are incapable of creating or maintaining a valid reason-
giving legal obligation, then Hart’s positivism cannot explain the possibility 
of a legal system existing where such officials are sufficiently prevalent.22  
Another possible line of reply for the Hartian might be simply to 
deny that the antinomian can be an official, or at least one of the officials 
whose recognition is key to the existence of the legal system. But I do not 
                                                           
21  I don’t think much turns upon whether our antinomian denies the possibility 
of legal obligations entirely or accepts the social-fact thrust of legal 
positivism (see e.g. Jules L Coleman, 'Rules and Social Facts' (1991) 14 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 703, 706), thereby accepting the 
bare existence of legal obligations, but denying that any are binding in 
themselves. The result of both positions is that legal obligations are not 
reason-generating. But see Rodriguez-Blanco, Peter Winch and H L A Hart: 
Two Concepts of the Internal Point of View op cit, p 462, which can be 
interpreted to argue for the collapse of this distinction in Hart, given that the 
failure to adopt the internal perspective by officials undermines both the 
existence and identification of the legal norm. 
22  One implication of this is to dispute the adequacy of Hart’s project as 
interpreted by Scott Shapiro. Shapiro holds that Hart did not intend for his 
account of social rules to explain how those rules could be reason-giving, 
believing this to be an unnecessary task for jurisprudence. Shapiro, What Is 
the Internal Point of View? op cit, p 1166. The argument of this paper shows 
that since Hart believed the adoption of the internal point of view by key 
officials to be conceptually necessary for the existence of a legal system, the 
lack of an account of how law is reason-giving in conjunction with this 
leaves too large a lacuna for the theory to be adequate. If we had an account 
of how a legal system could be reason-giving while still based upon a 
practice theory of the basic validity rule, then we might still be able to 
understand the existence of a legal system where key officials did not accept 
the internal point of view toward the rules. See also Rodriguez-Blanco, 
Peter Winch and H L A Hart: Two Concepts of the Internal Point of View op 
cit, p 465 (characterizing as 'the deepest problem in jurisprudence' to explain 
how law conceived as a set of rules can be reason. 
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think this line of argument is really open to a positivist. To make this claim, 
the positivist would have to say that the notion of what constitutes an 
official is set by the jurisprudential theory rather than by the law itself. It 
would be to say that accepting the law from the internal point of view is a 
necessary condition to being an official (or at least a key official). This 
cannot be compatible with a theory that holds the law to be comprised by 
social practice, under which the law itself must set the criteria for who 
counts as a valid official.23 24 While the jurisprudential theory could define 
the concept of an official more broadly than the constitutive conditions of 
any given legal system, it cannot do so more narrowly or risk defining 
otherwise operative and functioning legal systems out of existence. That 
move might be open to a traditional natural lawyer (who would be more 
comfortable denying the title ‘legal system’ to a system not sufficiently in 
accord with external reason or morality), but not a positivist. One might 
think that this problem is alleviated somewhat if we retreat to say simply 
that, while an antinomian can be an official as defined by law, she cannot be 
a key official, defined by Hart’s theory as someone whose behaviour helps 
to constitute and apply the rule of recognition. The problem with this retreat 
is that, once again, the particular legal system often makes it clear which 
officials are key in Hart’s sense. If the judges of a constitutional court or an 
executive empowered to enforce only those laws she considers valid are 
antinomians, who is the Hartian to claim that they are not key officials? 
One question might be what level of prevalence among officials 
creates the problem for positivism?25 The answer to this question will have 
to be left somewhat vague, as demanded by the vagueness of the notion of 
the key officials. For one, since the notion of which officials are key for 
Hart is left up to the legal system itself, the level of prevalence that creates 
                                                           
23  This can be seen as an application of Raz’s claim: ‘The law itself determines 
which facts create laws and which abrogate them’. Raz, Practical Reason 
and Norms op cit, p 152. See also Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: 
Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (1994) 280 note 28 (explaining 
that the rule of recognition identifies the bodies on whom it imposes a duty 
to recognize as valid the rules that fit the descriptions it contains). 
24  Many legal systems require officials to undertake oaths to uphold the law. 
One might be tempted to see this as building a requirement into the legal 
system that accepting the law from the internal point of view is a 
constitutive criterion to being an official of the system (putting aside the 
obvious problem that the official can simply lie in taking the oath and would 
still be considered an official by the system). While this might be common, 
it is by no means necessary to the existence of the legal system. Hence, there 
are many possible (and likely actual) systems that do not legally require 
their officials to (avow that they) accept the law from the internal point of 
view. 
25  I thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal for raising this question. 
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the problem will vary by legal system. Where the system contains a 
constitutional court empowered to make determinations of validity, those 
officials will certainly be key; and any number of anarchists on that court 
sufficient to affect an outcome will be sufficient to cause a problem for the 
theory. Generally, since under positivism legal validity generally depends 
upon a web of acceptance among key officials, one anarchist official is not 
likely to be problematic unless she is particularly well placed. It is likely 
that where the system contains an executive empowered to enforce laws 
considered valid by that executive, that official and any subordinates who 
have final operational decision in the application of certain laws will be key 
officials. In such cases, one well-placed anarchist would be enough to 
create a problem for the theory. Lest it be thought too remote a possibility 
to be worrisome, consider the case of Jón Gnarr, elected mayor of 
Reykjavik, Iceland (home to more than a third of the country’s population) 
in May, 2010. An avowed anarchist, his Best Party, which controls much of 
city government after the election, is made up primarily of punk rockers.26 
Unfortunately, an emailed request to his administration to define his 
understanding of anarchism and its relation to the reason-giving aspect of 
law went unanswered. Nevertheless, clearly the municipal legal system of 
Reykjavik did not cease to exist upon the ascension of his administration, 
meaning either the officials do not hold the requisite problematic beliefs or 
legal positivism as it stands has a lacuna. 
However, whatever level of prevalence of anarchists among key 
officials is required to create the problem - even if the likelihood of that 
level is remote - the conceptual possibility of such a legal system indicates 
that Hart’s theory is not complete: there is at least one legal system possible 
that his theory cannot explain. 
Another question might be what an anarchist key official would have 
to do in order to create the problem for positivism? As will become clear, it 
may be nothing more than doing her job while believing that nothing she 
does creates non-prudential reasons. 
Hart’s ecumenism 
Under Hart’s theory, any reason (other than pure fear of reprisal) for 
internal acceptance on the part of the officials is enough to create legal 
reasons. The problem with Hart’s theory is that it seems to lead to one or 
the other of two difficult positions: Either it allows a perspective that would 
not believe in any legal reasons to create or uphold them. Or we are led 
back to excluding anarchist officials and saying that they cannot create legal 
reasons because they cannot adopt them from the internal point of view. 
                                                           
26  Sally McGrane, Icelander's Campaign Is a Joke, until He's Elected (2010). 
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This would be difficult because then the theory would not be able to explain 
the presence of law in (or would counter-intuitively deny the title of ‘law’ 
to) a system populated (extensively or in key positions) with anarchist 
officials.  
Let us examine Raz’s explanation of Hart’s theory of the rule of 
recognition, which culminates in his suggestion that judges can be 
anarchists.27 Among other things, Raz wishes to highlight the fact that those 
who accept and apply the basic rule that gives the validity criteria for rules 
within a given legal system do not need to do so for moral reasons.  
[T]hat a rule is followed by a person requires only that 
he holds it to be valid, i.e., believes that the norm 
subjects are justified in following it – justified perhaps, 
only because it already exists and is practiced and 
despite the fact that it should not have been made and 
that it should even now be changed.28 
The subject is the person to whom the rule or norm is addressed. For 
the purposes of parsing this passage it is very important to distinguish two 
types of rules and two types of subjects. There are the usual rules of law, 
most of which are likely to be primary rules of behaviour, aimed at the 
citizens, residents, or simply all those present within the jurisdiction of that 
legal system. These usual rules also include secondary rules that confer 
power on citizens or officials, but they are less important at the moment. 
However, one (or more29) of those secondary rules is the rule of 
recognition, a collection of the validity conditions for the recognition of law 
within that legal system, guiding the legal officials to determinations about 
what counts as the law of that system.30 So a legal official is a special kind 
of subject to a special kind of rule. When a legal official views a primary 
rule to be valid law, she believes that people who are subject to the rule ‘are 
justified in following it’ because it conforms to the validity criteria within 
the rule of recognition.31 When a legal official does that, she is also 
                                                           
27  Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (1975) 147. 
28  id. 
29  Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory 
of Legal System (2d ed, 1980) 200. 
30  Hart did hold that private citizens could also be guided by the rule of 
recognition, but this is not necessary. Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 
100. 
31  The official does not have to be self-consciously aware of the rule of 
recognition itself. Indeed it might just be a description of convergent 
practices on the part of the officials that the officials use – perhaps 
subconsciously – as validity criteria. But this is disputed in the literature. 
Compare, e.g. Julie Dickson, 'Is the Rule of Recognition Really a 
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following the rule of recognition herself and believes herself (as a subject of 
that rule) to be justified in doing so.32 Once again, within the theory this is 
conceptually necessary for the legal system to exist: ‘Without supposing 
that officials take the attitude of norm-acceptance to the rule of recognition, 
there could be no rule of recognition and hence law could not exist as a 
conceptual matter.’33 
Raz continues his discussion of the rule of recognition: 
Moreover, the official may follow the rule either 
without having any beliefs about why he is justified in 
doing so, or for prudential reasons (his best way of 
securing a comfortable life or of avoiding social 
embarrassment, etc.), or even for moral reasons which 
are based on his moral rejection of the system. An 
anarchist, for example, may become a judge on the 
ground that if he follows the law most of the time he 
will be able to disobey it on the few but important 
occasions when to do so will tend most to undermine it. 
Another may become a judge because he holds that he 
is justified in applying the law of which he disapproves 
when he is bound to do so if he makes good use of the 
powers judges have to make new laws and change 
existing laws on occasion.34 
While it might be possible to imagine someone taking these positions 
in order to undermine the system, it is not yet clear whether such a person 
could create legal reasons, especially if she does not herself believe in those 
reasons. One important point that would tend to argue in favour of allowing 
such an official to create legal reasons is Hart’s discussion of the difference 
between an obligation (as a kind of reason) and being obliged.35 In 
supporting the claim that orders backed by threats cannot create obligations 
                                                                                                                                       
Conventional Rule?' (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1  with 
Andrei Marmor, Social Conventions : From Language to Law (2009) 162. 
32  Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View? op cit, p 1165. 
33  id. 
34  Raz, Practical Reason and Norms op cit, p 148. As will be discussed in the 
next section, there are significant differences between the anarchist judge, as 
described by Raz here, and the antinomian official we are considering as 
problematic for the theory. For one, the judge described here appears 
capable of seeing the law as providing non-prudential instrumental reasons 
to act in certain ways in order to undermine the system (assuming that is a 
goal that can generate non-prudential reasons, e.g., to take personal risks to 
undermine the system for the sake of the betterment of others). Our 
antinomian anarchist is not particularly concerned to undermine the system. 
35  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 82. 
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but rather only oblige the subject to act in conformity with the order, Hart 
notes that being obliged is purely a psychological causal explanation for 
action, while having an obligation is a normative explanation that is 
independent of the subject’s belief. It is therefore possible to have an 
obligation and not be aware of it, which would make no sense when applied 
to being obliged.36 If the existence of the obligation can be independent of 
the subject’s belief, then we might be able to say that the legal official can 
create an obligation (or reason) without believing herself to have done so.37 
If the (antinomian) anarchist judge hands down a decision that someone is 
legally obligated to behave in a certain way, then that person has a legal 
reason to do so even if the judge does not actually believe her own decision 
to have any implications for the person’s moral obligations or to provide 
any reasons other than prudential.  
The problem with this view arises when we incorporate Hart’s 
understanding of rule-following into the picture. The difference between 
something being a rule and it being merely a regularity of behaviour is 
taking an internal perspective on it, taking a ‘critical reflective attitude’, 
seeing it as offering guidance and as a reason for the action and for criticism 
of failures to act.38 Otherwise, the ‘rule’ is merely a prediction of how 
people will behave. One accepts the rule when one takes the internal point 
of view with respect to it. ‘[O]ne takes the internal point of view towards a 
rule when one intends to conform to the rule, criticizes others for failing to 
conform, does not criticize others for criticizing, and expresses one's 
                                                           
36  This is not meant to imply that Hart would accept ‘metaphysical conceptions 
of obligation or duty as invisible objects mysteriously existing ‘above’ or 
‘behind’ the world of ordinary observable facts’ id, which he explicitly 
rejects as an alternative to the predictor theory. Instead, for Hart, that one 
can be under an obligation without being aware of the fact can be traced to 
the existence of a social rule (itself a social fact) that others adopt that 
applies to the person obligated id. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this 
journal for pointing out the need to mention this and the quotation. 
37  This should not be misunderstood to imply that legal officials can create 
legal reasons or obligations without the rest of the legal system in place to 
assign them that power. The official’s status and power depends on that 
wider system. Nevertheless, the system often does assign the power to create 
legal reasons or obligations to individual officials - with judges as perhaps 
the most conspicuous example - and even to private individuals, as in the 
case of contracts. Problems arise either when a significant number of 
officials of the background system that confers the power don’t believe in it, 
or when the power is conferred on a key official who doesn’t believe in it. I 
thank Michael Giudice for pointing out the need for this clarification. 
38  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 56. 
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criticism using evaluative language.’39 So the characteristic elements of rule 
acceptance are psychological and behavioural in nature.40  
Sometimes this psychological element might be obscured by Hart’s 
emphasis on the fact that the rule functions as the reason for action or 
criticism. After all, as with obligations, reasons can exist independently of 
anyone’s recognition of them.41 When I am crossing the street, I have a 
reason to look both ways even if I am unaware of that reason. I would have 
that reason even in a world of bad practical reasoners, in which no one was 
aware of that reason. But since, for Hart, these social rules depend 
ultimately for their validity on a shared practice (the rule of recognition),42 
their normativity must rest on at least some (official) internal acceptance.43 
True, as Raz points out, under Hart’s view one could have many different 
motivations for accepting the rule, which need not be based on moral 
considerations and even could extend to goals that would undermine the 
very system of which the rule is a part. However, it is difficult to see how 
an antinomian anarchist, who does not believe in the possibility of valid 
legal reasons, could internally accept and endorse a rule that obligates her to 
create or enforce legal reasons and obligations, no matter what her ultimate 
motive might be.  
Consider Hart’s claim that the characteristic manifestation of internal 
acceptance of the rule of recognition is the use of phrases like ‘it is the law 
that…’.44 When spoken by an anarchist official actively trying to undermine 
the system (perhaps when speaking of something she knows to be 
inconsistent with the rule of recognition), it does not reflect acceptance 
from the internal point of view. As Scott Shapiro explains it, ‘the internal 
point of view refers to a specific kind of normative attitude held by certain 
                                                           
39  Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View? op cit, p 1163. 
40  Rodriguez-Blanco, Peter Winch and H L A Hart: Two Concepts of the 
Internal Point of View op cit, p 463 argues that Hart eschewed a 
psychological explanation of the internal point of view in favour of a two 
stage explanation of the internal point of view (the first of which was 
behavioural and the second of which was ‘volitional’), in order to explain 
legal rules as obligatory and differentiate them from orders backed by 
threats. Even if we reject the need for any deep psychological explanation, 
however, the problem of the anarchist official is therefore just as pressing in 
that the official lacks the volitional component of the internal point of view.   
41  Raz, Practical Reason and Norms op cit, p 17. 
42  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 255. 
43  In support of this compare Hart’s discussion of the scorer of a game who 
stops obeying the scoring rules. Id. 
44  id. 
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insiders, namely, those who accept the legitimacy of the rules.’45 Granted, 
this anarchist is using the fact of others’ acceptance to undermine the 
system, and relying perhaps on the fact that others will perceive such 
language as acceptance. Hart seems to have some appreciation of this when 
discussing the acceptance of the rule of recognition as ‘manifested’ by the 
behaviour of officials acting in accordance with it.46 But by Hart’s own 
logic, if there is no internal acceptance of the rules, then there can be no 
obligation, since the rules will not function as a reason for compliance. Hart 
claims quite clearly that acceptance of the rule of recognition by officials is 
logically necessary for the existence of a legal system.47 Hence, a legal 
system in which many or even simply key officials are not accepting the 
rule of recognition should be a conceptual impossibility.48 
Hart recognised the problem of legal officials refusing to follow the 
rule of recognition (e.g., by making decisions they believe to be inconsistent 
with it), and claimed that it leads us only to an aberrant borderline case of a 
legal system, one which is simply a step away from dissolution due to the 
chaos of conflicting judicial orders.49 But what if the choices of these 
anarchists accidentally go against their goal of undermining the legal 
system and actually serve to strengthen it? After all, if the officials start 
claiming validity for rules they know fail to meet the criteria of validity, or 
even if they simply start denying validity to those they know to meet the 
                                                           
45  Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View? op cit, p 1159. Of course for 
Hart, this ‘normative attitude’ does not necessarily imply a belief in the 
moral legitimacy of the rules. 
46  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 101. 
47  id. 
48  This discussion calls attention to a possible ambiguity in Hart’s use of 
‘accept’ when applied to officials in that he sometimes seems to consider it 
purely behaviourally and sometimes psychologically (or ‘volitionally,’ see 
above n 40). It is clear that, in assessing the social aspect of rules (including 
a practice theory rule like the rule of recognition), we must look to 
behaviour in order to assess practically the existence and application of the 
rule. However, Hart’s clear reference to the necessity of a ‘critical reflective 
attitude’ and repeated discussions of the nature of internal acceptance as 
seeing the rule as reason-giving lead me to conclude that some 
psychological elements are essential in Hart’s explanation. See John 
Gardner, 'Nearly Natural Law' (2007) 52 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 1, 9. Raz argues that Hart’s notion of acceptance amounts to a 
full moral endorsement. Joseph Raz, 'The Purity of the Pure Theory' (1981) 
35 Revue Internationale de Philosophie 441, 454; Kevin Toh, 'Raz on 
Detachment, Acceptance and Describability' (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 403, 414. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal for 
suggesting the need for this clarification. 
49  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 116. 
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criteria, people might start to cling more desperately to the legal system.50 
Then the social fact of the presence of the legal system is independent of 
officials accepting the rule of recognition. Thinking about the ‘lusus 
naturae’ of this situation not only ‘sharpens our awareness of what is often 
too obvious to be noticed’,51 it threatens Hart’s theory itself. 
Raz’s judge and validity vs. obligation 
In order to understand this problem more fully, and to see that it is a 
problem not limited to Hart’s particular form of positivism, let us turn to the 
distinction raised earlier between legal validity and a moral obligation 
created by law. Clearly, one might believe in a structure of legal validity 
emanating from a central validity rule, like the rule of recognition, without 
believing that the law is creating any moral obligations, or for that matter, 
any non-prudential reasons. Raz is not interested in supporting a general 
moral obligation to obey the law, and in fact argues against one.52 Any 
theoretical tension raised by his example of the anarchist judge must be 
understood in light of his use of it to elucidate Hart’s theory. The question 
is therefore whether the anarchist judge poses any difficulty to a positivist 
theory of law with Razian refinements. I think he has made the problem a 
bit more difficult to see, but hasn’t completely eradicated it. 
The primary distinction between Hart and Raz on the subject of 
obligation is that Hart believes legal obligation to be a separate class of 
socially created obligation, distinct from morality (but still non-
prudential).53 So for him the problem with the anarchist official is whether 
officials who do not believe the law can create reasons for action can still 
create legal obligations (which are a kind of reason for action). For Raz, 
valid legal obligations purport to be moral obligations. Indeed, where they 
are legitimate exercises of authority, they are successful creations (or 
reports) of moral obligation. So for Raz, the problem is whether officials 
who do not believe the law can ever successfully create non-prudential 
obligations can still use the law to do so. 
Raz raised the example of the anarchist judge in the context of 
discussing Hart’s rule of recognition, using the language of one being 
‘justified’ in following a rule rather than being ‘bound’ by the rule (in the 
                                                           
50  See Raz, The Concept of a Legal System : An Introduction to the Theory of 
Legal System op cit, p 200 (noting that officials might not meet with 
criticism if they stop recognizing the validity of laws as picked out by the 
rule of recognition). 
51  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 116. 
52  Raz, Practical Reason and Norms op cit, p 233. 
53  See above n 10 and text accompanying n 16. 
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sense of obligation) precisely in order to focus on the notion of the validity 
of rules, rather than their bindingness.54 Here is where the distinction 
between valid legal rules and morally binding legal rules becomes most 
important. Since, for Raz, a legally valid, duty-imposing rule necessarily 
claims to impose a moral obligation,55 it can only be binding if it is 
successful in imposing a moral obligation (otherwise its claim to be binding 
is false). Hence we can talk directly of its moral bindingness. If an 
antinomian key official can recognise the legal validity of legal rules 
without agreeing to their moral bindingness, then the antinomian might not 
appear to pose a threat to the theory’s explanation of law and legal 
systems.56 After all, we would have a systemically valid legal system since 
legal validity depends on the key officials internally accepting the rule of 
recognition and acting accordingly upon the rules that it guides them to 
recognise. So, all that seems necessary is that the official accepts the rule of 
recognition enough to establish the legal validity of legal rules. Raz doesn’t 
believe that laws by themselves morally obligate us,57 but clearly still 
believes we have legal systems, so this would appear to be the tactic he 
favours.  
The problem is that, ex hypothesi, the antinomian official believes 
that the law only commands by force, and the only reasons it ‘creates’ are 
those represented by the threat of force, as well as any solutions it offers to 
important coordination problems. I put the word ‘creates’ in quotes because 
either these purely prudential reasons pre-date their legal application and 
                                                           
54  Raz makes a distinction between validity tout court and legal validity - 
holding the former to be true of a rule when its subjects have some 
justification in following it, and the latter to be true of a rule only when the 
rule is validated within and by a wider legal system (where ‘the fact that it 
belongs to [the] system is (part of) a reason for its validity’). Hence it is 
possible for a norm to be legally valid in that it belongs to the system, 
without it being valid in any wider sense in that its subjects have no (non-
legal) justification for following it. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms op cit, 
p 127. See above, text accompanying notes 27 & 28. 
55  Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation : On the Theory of Law 
and Practical Reason (2009) 111. 
56  Raz believes that an official can behave as if the law is legally binding by 
making pronouncements of its legal validity, without believing that it is 
morally binding. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality (1979) 155. This claim and its implications will be discussed 
below. 
57  That is, they do not morally obligate us necessarily and independent of 
circumstance, but may, for example, if they help us to do the right thing 
better than we would do on our own. Joseph Raz, 'The Problem of 
Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception' (2006) 90 Minnesota Law 
Review 1003, 1014ff. 
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hence are not created by law, or they are created by the threat of force and 
not the legal rule itself. In the case of coordination solutions, the reason to 
do as the law demands comes from the pre-existing prudential reason one 
has to coordinate one’s behaviour with others in that pressing circumstance. 
Consider the fact that if there was another, non-legal, solution to the 
coordination problem which had an equal or better chance of success than 
the one proffered by law – including the chance that others will comply 
with it – then there would be no reason left to follow the law (unless we 
deny the antinomian hypothesis and understand the law to create non-
prudential reasons for compliance). Turning to the threat of force, it is the 
threatened force that is giving any reason for action, not the rule itself. If 
one can avoid the sanction, there is no reason to comply. So we are left with 
the following challenge: Does a belief that the only reasons law seems to 
generate are in the application and manipulation of pre-existing prudential 
ones contaminate the antinomian official’s ability to recognise the validity 
of legal rules within a positivist theory? 
Recalling Raz’s explanation that a belief in the validity of rules is a 
belief that those subject to the rules are justified in following them, it would 
appear that complying with a legal directive in order to avoid threatened 
force or head-on collisions (as an example of an important coordination 
problem) is a fine justification for compliance. However, under Hart’s 
original explanation of the internal acceptance of rules by officials, if the 
officials themselves only comply with the rules because of fear of reprisal, 
they never take the internal point of view.58 To quote Shapiro again: ‘Seen 
from the internal point of view, the law is not simply sanction-threatening, 
-directing, or -predicting, but rather obligation-imposing.’59 So, if the 
officials do not see the law as obligation-imposing, then they cannot take 
the internal point of view. And if they never take the internal point of view 
on the law, then we never get past the gunman situation into a bona fide 
legal system. They never see the rules themselves as reasons, signs for 
people to comply, instead of signs that people will comply.  
While ordinary citizens may not need to recognise their obligations 
and may always treat the law as a system of threats under Hart’s strain of 
legal positivism, at least the key officials must subjectively feel obligated 
                                                           
58  To the extent that solutions to important coordination problems, like what 
side of the street to drive on, are primary rules, the officials are more 
concerned (in their official roles) with creating and imposing such rules than 
in following them. While we can imagine a primary rule directed at officials 
to identify and solve important coordination problems, our antinomian will 
see that as simply another case of the law repeating a pre-existing moral 
obligation. 
59  Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View? op cit, p 1157. 
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by the rules guiding their legal validity decisions in order for legal validity 
itself to get off the ground. Hence, an antinomian official, who does not 
believe that the law creates reasons for action, does not believe that any law 
found legally valid under her application of the rule of recognition is 
creating any new reasons for action for others, other than one flowing from 
any threatened sanction for non-compliance or pre-existing reason to 
coordinate behaviour. The problem is then to explain how the law can still 
be a reason-generating normative system60 without the key officials’ 
internal acceptance of that fact, given the emphasis in the theories on the 
importance of official acceptance. 
This requires a deeper investigation of antinomian officials’ attitude 
toward the rule of recognition itself. Since questions about its legal validity 
are misplaced (since it is constitutive of legal validity for the system),61 it is 
not incumbent upon legal officials (or others) to accept it as legally valid. It 
is simply what is done and what is to be done by officials when determining 
legal validity. However, it seems that the key officials still must take the 
internal point of view on the rule of recognition in order to confer legal 
validity on the rest of the system.62 Put in Razian terms, key officials must 
accept the validity (tout court, i.e. the justifiability) of the rule of 
recognition. Judges, for Raz, ‘act on the belief that laws are valid reasons 
for action [and] hold laws to be exclusionary reasons in that they disregard 
all non-legal reasons except where allowed by law to act on non-legal 
reasons’.63 Raz and Shapiro both make it clear that Hart’s rule of 
recognition specifies the content of the officials’ duty to apply the law.64 If 
the antinomian official does not recognise a duty to apply the law, then it is 
difficult to see how she could take the internal point of view on the rule of 
recognition. 
                                                           
60  To say that a law is a norm entails that it is a reason for action. Raz, 
Practical Reason and Norms op cit, p 154. 
61  Hart, The Concept of Law op cit, p 109; Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 
op cit, p 151. 
62  As mentioned above, it might be possible within the theory for individual 
officials in non-key roles or who are isolated in their failure to adopt the 
internal point of view not to threaten the validity of the system. The problem 
arises when we consider what is entailed by the theory when too many or 
too important officials are antinomian anarchists. 
63  Raz, Practical Reason and Norms op cit, p 171. 
64  id; Scott J. Shapiro, 'What Is the Rule of Recognition (and Does It Exist)?' in 
Adler and Himma (ed), The Rule of Recognition and the Us Constitution 
(2009) . It should be noted that this interpretation of the rule of recognition 
as a duty-imposing rule is controversial. See e.g. Raz, The Concept of a 
Legal System : An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System op cit, p 199. 
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There are two refinements Raz makes, which must be addressed in 
order to show that the antinomian official is still a problem for Raz’s 
version of positivism. They both involve important elaborations on the 
perspective of the official upon whom the theory makes it incumbent to 
accept the rule of recognition from an internal point of view. The first is 
Raz’s claim that it is enough for an official to make committed normative 
statements about the law when declaring it valid.65 This implies the 
possibility of an official speaking as if the law is valid without believing it 
to be so. A quick read of a footnote in which Raz distinguishes between full 
endorsement of a rule and weak acceptance of the rule might seem to 
support this: 
It is important to distinguish … between one who fully 
endorses a rule, i.e. believes that its subjects ought to 
follow it, and one who weakly accepts it, i.e. believes 
that he should follow it himself. …. Hart maintains that 
judges at least weakly accept the rule of recognition. A 
judge who merely weakly accepts it must, it would 
seem, pretend that he fully endorses it. Hence his 
statements are fully normative.66 
The consideration, which Raz mentions elsewhere,67 of officials 
pretending to endorse a rule, when applied to the rule of recognition only 
means that officials are ‘weakly’ accepting it. That is, they still must believe 
that they should follow it themselves. Their pretence is in any statements 
that others should be bound by it. But it still appears necessary for the 
judges to have weak acceptance in order for there to be a legal system. In 
support of this consider Raz’s notion of the ‘legal point of view’. The legal 
point of view consists of the norms of the legal system itself and any other 
norms the system requires its subjects to act upon. The person who acts 
from the legal point of view follows those legal norms and sees them as 
‘exclusionary reasons for disregarding [any] conflicting reasons which they 
exclude’.68 But while it is not necessary for most subjects to act according 
to the legal point of view in order for the system to be in force, ‘it is 
necessary that its judges, when acting as judges, should on the whole be 
acting according to the legal point of view. This entails also that the courts 
must regard ordinary citizens as required to [act from the legal point of 
                                                           
65  Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality op cit, p 155. 
66  id. 
67  E.g. Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties op cit, p 130. 
68  Raz, Practical Reason and Norms op cit, p 171. See also, Luís Duarte 
d’Almeida, 'Legal Statements and Normative Language' (2011) 30 Law and 
Philosophy 167, 180; Toh, Raz on Detachment, Acceptance and 
Describability op cit, p 408. 
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view] and judge them accordingly.’69 The only way to square these two 
passages with each other is to say that the judge who only has weak 
acceptance of the rule of recognition (i.e. only sees himself as justified in 
following it, without extending that judgment to others) is limiting the 
weakness of that acceptance to the rule of recognition itself. He is thereby 
still acting from the legal point of view. But, in so doing, he is also still 
viewing others as required to follow (not just comply) with the particular 
rules he picks out as legally valid.70 However, our antinomian official does 
not even have weak acceptance since she does not believe herself (let alone 
others) to be bound by the rule of recognition. Nor does she believe that 
others are bound by the rules it picks out as valid. So if we are not blinded 
by the theory and think it plausible still to say that we have a legal system 
after we elect or appoint a slate of antinomian anarchists, then there is still a 
problem with the theory. After all, if we did elect a slate of antinomian 
anarchists to key positions, I believe they would have to take affirmative 
steps to nullify the legal system – not that it would cease to exist as soon as 
they took office. 
The other important and related point Raz raises is the prevalence of 
what he calls ‘detached’ perspectives on the law. These are exemplified by 
his example of the meat-eater who accompanies his vegetarian friend to a 
dinner party, warning the friend, ‘‘You should not eat this dish. It contains 
meat.’’71 The statement highlights reasons from a point of view that is not 
necessarily shared by the speaker. (In other contexts, such as that of a law 
professor lecturing on what the law requires, the speaker might share a 
belief in the reasons but the statement doesn’t commit him in any way.) 
While such statements are certainly common in legal contexts, the examples 
Raz gives are invariably of people who are not fulfilling key official roles: 
law professors, legal scholars, and lawyers advising clients.72 Indeed, Raz 
                                                           
69  Raz, Practical Reason and Norms op cit, p 171. 
70  One might object that, according to Raz’s analysis, statements like 
‘According to law, you ought to pay your taxes’ ‘simply state what one has 
reason to do from the legal point of view, namely, what ought to be done if 
legal norms are valid [i.e. justifiable] norms …. [without] presuppos[ing] 
that the law is valid’. Id. While it is true that the semantics of the statements 
themselves allow for their truth when uttered without a belief in the validity 
of the norm, it is clear from the passages above that this is not an option for 
the judge charged with determining and asserting their legal validity. This 
issue will also be dealt with in the next paragraph. 
71  id. See also Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality op cit, 
p 155. 
72  Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality op cit, p 153; Raz, 
Practical Reason and Norms op cit, p 176. Raz’s discussion of the detached 
perspective follows Kelsen, who noted that anarchists could be law 
professors, ‘describ[ing] positive law as a system of valid norms, without 
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contrasts the detached statement with the internal statement that is 
‘characteristic of the judge, and of the law-abiding citizens…’.73 The 
question remains whether it is possible for a judge to adopt only the 
detached perspective.74  
Recall that Raz raises the possibility of the anarchist judge in the 
context of expanding upon Hart’s list of possible motivations an official 
might have for taking the internal point of view with regard to the rule of 
recognition.75 His anarchist is one who follows the rule of recognition in 
order to undermine the legal system at key points.76 This person, it could be 
argued, will see the rule of recognition as providing provisional reasons for 
determining which laws to call valid, even if some of those reasons are 
overridden at key points by the anarchist’s project of undermining the 
system. The problem is that the antinomian official, as we’ve defined her, 
might fit Raz’s description of an anarchist judge (although I think that is 
still unclear), but does not take the point of view necessary for a functioning 
legal system. Raz held that officials can endorse and follow the law for any 
reason, or no reason.77 But they must still endorse and follow it in some 
way, while our antinomian is not doing so. Even when she makes detached 
statements of law, she maintains an ‘external perspective’ on both the rule 
of recognition and the rules of the legal system. She does not see them as 
justifying or legitimating criticism of those who do not conform, and she 
assigns evaluative statements made on the basis of the norms of the system 
to others, without adopting them herself.78 While Hart, Raz, and Shapiro all 
concur that there is no necessity for an official to accept the moral value of 
the rule of recognition or the legal system that it validates, an antinomian 
                                                                                                                                       
having to approve of this law’. H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (1978) 218 n 
82. Contrary to Kevin Toh’s assertion at Toh, Raz on Detachment, 
Acceptance and Describability op cit, p 408, Raz’s examples of detached 
statements include those made by lawyers but not those made by judges. 
‘Judges, if anyone, take the law as it claims it should be taken. They more 
than anyone acknowledge the law at its own estimation.’ Raz, Hart on 
Moral Rights and Legal Duties op cit, p 131. In an email, Toh admitted to 
me that he did not see the need for a distinction between judges and lawyers 
at the time he wrote. 
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official still cannot take the internal point of view they all agree is so 
necessary to Hart’s theory, and by extension, most modern legal positivism. 
This discussion can be boiled down to a final question. Putting aside 
the discussion of detached statements and weak acceptance, why isn’t it 
enough for Raz (or Hart for that matter) to simply say that officials need 
only to profess publically to uphold the reason-giving ability of the law, 
rather than that they must privately accept it in some way?79 For a first 
reply, the antinomian official, as we have envisioned her, has no obvious 
reason to make a false claim to uphold the law as reason-giving. It is not 
clearly a precondition of her taking office. It seems entirely possible that a 
judge could be elected or appointed to a key role who claims only to decide 
what’s best given the facts presented and without depending on previous 
decisions or legislation as binding. That judge can even go so far as to say 
that her decision itself does not give the parties any reason to comply 
beyond threats of sanction or other pre-existing prudential considerations. If 
the network of other officials is not predisposed to seeing this as 
problematic, it need not create any immediate problems for the legal system 
as a whole. 
Beyond this point, however, the thrust of this paper is to suggest that 
it is not a threat to positivism to say that officials need not privately accept 
the law as reason-giving, although this would make for an amendment to 
these theories as they stand. As they stand, Hart’s and Raz’s theories 
incorporate the need for official internal acceptance. One issue is that 
without that internal acceptance, it is difficult to get a clear handle on the 
nature of legal obligation. Raz, for one, is in a position to do away with the 
need for internal acceptance more easily in that, under his theory, a 
detached statement of legal obligation can be understood to be true just in 
case the statement actually describes a moral obligation, a fact not 
dependent upon the official’s belief. This possibility is opened up by his 
theory of authority, under which the facts that legitimate a directive need 
not be the ones considered by the official making it.80 Indeed, the space his 
theory leaves for this possibility makes the criticism above appear more in 
the way of suggesting simply that he carries through on another break with 
Hart and jettison the need for official internal acceptance entirely. One 
passage that might initially seem to cut against this possibility being open to 
Raz is where he notes that legal authorities ‘regard themselves as having the 
right to impose obligations on their subjects, … claim[] that their subjects 
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owe them allegiance, and that their subjects ought to obey the law as it 
requires to be obeyed…’.81 However, that passage equates legal authorities 
with ‘the institutions of law’ and, for Raz, the claims of the institutions and 
the claims of the officials can come apart,82 leaving open the possibility of 
Raz accommodating officials’ private rejection even as the institutions 
themselves are understood to claim obedience. To the extent that some 
critics of Raz believe it to be a weakness of his theory of authority that the 
claims of law can be analyzed independently of those of officials,83 
jettisoning that idea by Raz would make it more difficult for him to reply to 
the points I raise in this paper.  
Conclusion 
We are left with the fact that, as it stands, one of the most influential 
theories of law in discussion today cannot account for the conceptual 
possibility of a legal system where some or all of the key officials do not 
accept the value or validity of that system. While it is admittedly an 
unlikely turn of events that such officials come to power, that the theory 
entails such a legal system is conceptually impossible represents a gap in 
our understanding of the law itself.  
Given the power of legal positivism, it is unlikely that the best 
solution will be to scrap it entirely. Instead, I suspect that a solution will be 
found in a greater focus on the interplay between the actions and attitudes 
of officials and of the rest of the public. Brian Tamanaha, for example, 
argues that the public creates the officials,84 and Sanne Taekema has 
recently argued that too much has been made of the distinction between 
officials and the rest of the public in positivist theories.85 Frederick Schauer 
has also argued that the possibility of a system in which the judges ‘have no 
non-prudential reason to adopt the internal point of view’ should lead us to 
reject the judges as the key officials for determining the rule of recognition, 
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preferring possibly the public at large.86 Without endorsing these particular 
theories, I note them as potential solutions to the problem outlined in this 
paper. This problem should, therefore, be seen as an additional motivation 
for pursuing these and similar attempts at altering the dependence legal 
positivism has upon the beliefs of key legal officials.  
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